

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

INSTALLATION TRANSFORMATION: A PERSPECTIVE FROM A U.S. ARMY
SUPPORT GROUP IN KOREA

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ABSTRACT

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Transformation of today's Army is the responsibility of the entire force regardless of which level is supporting the process. The Installation Management Activity has been assigned to assume daily control of Army installations. Department of the Army's intent was to relieve senior mission commanders of daily management responsibilities which will be assumed by trained garrison commanders supported by a standard garrison staff. This transfer of responsibilities sought to assure that standard levels of services were provided to soldiers, civilians, and family members regardless of geographic location. To ensure this installation transformation was fully implemented, the internal culture of spending, base operations management, and command and control of installations would be significantly changed. Successful installation management transformation would require additional training, new funding strategies, and standardized installation quality controls. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) offers the perspective of a U.S. Army Support Group stationed in Korea on the status of installation transformation.

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PREFACE

Prior to writing this paper I assessed the value of documenting issues and challenges my Area Support Group encountered while transforming into a Standard Garrison Organization under the Installation Management Agency. Working installation support and base operations management, for the past five years provided me with a keen functional and technical insight that Eighth Army wanted on the ground to ensure Korea installations a smooth and seamless operation while continuing to support the senior mission commander and daily installation management throughout the peninsula. Although I am not an expert, the past 5 years as the Deputy to the Commander of the 20th Area Support Group/Area IV might provide a different perspective than the average CONUS installation.

I would like to thank my beautiful wife Rosalie, "the love of my life", for putting up with all the long hours working on this paper. I didn't realize how much time or effort it takes to write a paper of this magnitude and what it really required. I am a better researcher and writer from experiencing this process. I would also like to thank my Project Advisor for providing the guidance and leadership in ensuring there was meaningful content as the subject was difficult and a professionally written product to be proud of.

INSTALLATION TRANSFORMATION: A PERSPECTIVE FROM A U.S. ARMY SUPPORT GROUP STATIONED IN KOREA

The preeminent agency in the Department of Defense that produces highly effective, state-of-the-art installations worldwide, maximizing support to the people, readiness and transformation of an expeditionary force.¹

- Installation Management Agency
"Vision" February 2003

A quality, trained, and ready team of military and civilians; role model in power projection and sustainment; enduring organization committed to excellence; A vibrant partner with our Korean communities and customer-focused provider of first-class programs, facilities, & services.²

- Area IV Support Activity
"Vision" April 2004

One of the key transformation challenges facing the United States Army is a full and successful implementation of Installation Management. In today's complex, evolving, contemporary operating environment with constantly changing commitments placed on our military, the Army can no longer run its installations as it did in the 20th century. Former Secretary of the Army, Thomas White, declared to installation commanders and managers that "Transformation in Installation Management will happen now under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) and managed by an independent organization, with the intent to relieve the daily management duties from our senior mission commanders and place it with professionals who will run our installations."³ Secretary White was endorsing the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which states that "Finally, the defense strategy calls for the transformation of the U.S. military and defense establishment over time. Transformation is at the heart of this new strategic approach. Without change, the current defense program will only become more expensive to maintain over time, and it will forfeit many opportunities to change."⁴ To truly transform installation management, the expanded roles of installation managers in staging deployed forces, in command and control, in mission funding and infrastructure management must be documented and authorized. To be successful, a smooth transition plan utilizing a comprehensive approach to successfully transform our installations into the 21st century will be required.

PURPOSE

This SRP identifies the challenges and issues related to transformation of installation management in Korea. Successful installation transformation would be marked by a standardized organization responsible for installation services modeled after Continental United States (CONUS) installations. However, there were many challenges Overseas Continental United States (OCONUS) installations would face due to the Standard Garrison Organization (SGO) model was developed based on CONUS based installations and did not mirror OCONUS organizations. General Leon LePorte, the Korean sub-unified commander, recently asked during an Eighth United States Army readiness brief, “with over 100 installations throughout Korea, and the mission sharply focused on ready to fight tonight, how we can continue to manage our installations and provide common services? The key questions we should be asking are how and what services to provide, to whom and what Common Level of Support (CLS) will be provided”.⁵ OCONUS installations have faced numerous issues that adversely affected implementation, such as Operation and Maintenance Army (OMA) funding shortages; U.S. and Local National (LN) hiring practices; contract constraints; cost of stationing forces overseas; and, most importantly the general ill feeling of the local Korean population toward military presence. Transformation challenges facing OCONUS installations affect the timeliness of transforming installation management from the 20th Area Support Group to the Area IV Support Activity -- a separate installation under the Korea Region Office (KORO) and the Installation Management Agency (IMA).

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

To appreciate the challenges and complexities facing installation managers in Korea, especially the 20th ASG and Area IV Support Activity, it's important to understand the mission and history of United States Forces Korea (USFK), especially its command and control arrangements responsible for providing installation support for the past 50 years. Consider the mission of Eighth United States Army: “Supports deterrence of North Korea (NK) aggression against the Republic of Korea (ROK) and provide combat support and combat service support to assigned, attached, and other designated forces within the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO)”.⁶ Although the Korean theater is not unique in supporting a 24 hours a day, 7 days a week mission as other OCONUS installations face similar on-call requirements, the likelihood of confrontation is real and must be considered when analyzing base operation requirements. To completely understand the differences between base operations management in the Republic of

Korea and CONUS installations, there is a need to explore the early years of installation management in the Republic of Korea.

HISTORY OF BASE OPERATIONS IN KOREA (PHASE 1: 1950-1970)

During the early years after the Korean armistice, the U.S. government began its long term commitment to stabilize the Korean peninsula, using a “one year at a time” management style. In that uncertain environment, decisions related to installation management were delayed, so the tough questions were never answered. They were usually left to the incoming commander. Management of installations was not considered an important military task. The senior installation commander simply regarded installation management as an additional task – perhaps a nuisance! With Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) requirements often drawing from base infrastructure funding, installation requirement shortfalls persisted without regard for the long-term effects of the policy to fix-it-later. There was no system to measure installation infrastructure requirements as the Installation Status Report (ISR) system was not yet in place, so actual requirements were whatever the senior mission commander stated. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) stated in 2001 “historically the Army spends less than 1% of its budget on buildings compared to over 3% in the civilian sector, while continuing to provide installations that train, power project, sustain and provide communities, while synchronizing with the force.”⁷ In order for installations to survive, fundamental changes in spending habits and a commitment to long term stationing of troops in a deployed environment would require major changes by Army leadership.

In 1961 Major General Chong Hee Park staged a military takeover of the Republic of Korea government. “The U.S. never found it easy to deal with President Park, whose agenda was shaped by his country's immediate needs, not broader issues such as human rights or free trade. When he seized power in 1961, he was virtually unknown to American officials”⁸. Major General Park limited his country's expansion to rebuilding the country's infrastructure through the road and rail systems throughout the mid-sixties. While incidents of a theater still at war were apparent, both sides continued military buildups versus infrastructure buildup funding, resulting in a deterioration of administrative buildings and installation infrastructure. Installation support was unilaterally overlooked by installation commanders as infrastructure requirements identified by Public Work (PW) personnel were funded sparingly and limited to minor administrative and barracks fixes.

Although the United States and Republic of Korea governments fully supported the alliance and agreed that U.S. troops should be stationed on the peninsula, there was a lack of a

long term commitment to improve the quality of infrastructure throughout the country. Installations north of Seoul consisted of temporary living and administrative buildings. Little was done to improve soldiers' welfare. Our military leaders focused almost exclusively on the prospect of having to "fight tonight".

Was managing installations a senior mission commander's afterthought while infrastructure funding was the last priority on the funding chain? There seemed to be little urgency in funding buildings and barracks shortfalls, since there was still a "one year at a time mentality" and long term shuffling of OPTEMPO priorities were too difficult. The Republic of Korea government was still evolving; it was unwilling to offer any financial support to the U.S. infrastructure. There was a U.S. military presence in the Republic of Korea that assisted in rebuilding their country, but the decision to permanently station troops on established installations had not been agreed upon by the two governments. Training and surviving were what commanders concentrated on; daily ensuring soldier's basic needs were met was their foremost concern. In the late 1960's and early 1970's Eighth U.S. Army began to expand its footprint and started construction of new barracks throughout the peninsula and provided needed repair and maintenance funds to overhaul administrative facilities at installations in the southern areas of the peninsula. This new found commitment would require additional funding from both governments to ensure a permanent footprint of installations throughout the peninsula.

HISTORY OF BASE OPERATIONS IN KOREA (PHASE 2: 1970-1980)

Throughout the mid-1970s, Eighth Army's role changed as the Republic of Korea, with American financial and technical assistance, began production of M-16 rifles and marked the beginning of the Korean government investing in its own defense industry by locally manufacturing ammunition, vehicles, missiles, artillery and tanks. In 1977, U.S. President Jimmy Carter began to fulfill his campaign promise to "to withdraw all U.S. troops from South Korea but after meeting in 1979 with President Park Chung Hee, Carter announced that U.S. troops would remain and that the U.S. would expand its security relationship with South Korea."⁹

Beginning in the late 1970's, the 19th Support Command, now the 19th Theater Support Command (TSC) assumed responsibility for centralized installation management and as the theater logistics command providing logistical support throughout the peninsula. The 19th Support Command provided base support and control to over 130 installations throughout Korea. The command structure was: a Corps Support Command supporting the 2nd Infantry Division and Area I in the northern area of Korea and providing base operations support; the

34th Support Group/Area II supporting the Seoul area; the 23rd Support Group with a mission limited to Pyongtaek; Area III Support Activity serving Pyongtaek and the northeastern part of Korea; the 20th Area Support Group/Area IV Support Activity which was the largest geographic Area Support Group (ASG) responsible for management of the entire southern area of Korea; and the 20th Area Support Group/Area IV Support Activity.

HISTORY OF BASE OPERATIONS IN KOREA (PHASE 3: 1980-2000)

Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) faced continuing challenges through the 1980's and early 1990's on how to transform installation support and to streamline the process to create a more efficient and effective installation management system with limited funding. In a deployed environment of Korea, the combatant commander's mission versus installation support model was developed out of necessity to support the customer while continuing to train and prepare to "fight tonight" concentrating on mission issues. The fundamental issue facing military leaders continued to be reallocating infrastructure funds to mission accounts and how senior mission commanders, responsible for installation management issues, ensured funding earmarked for infrastructure, was expended on projects identified and funded by HQDA. This complex issue would require a dramatic shift in installation management and how IMA would ultimately control installations when several different tactical commanders shared the same installation.

19th Support Command and Eighth Army faced a complex issue on supporting installation management while maintaining theater logistic support to the senior mission commander. Infrastructure requirements were increasing and installation commanders were faced with the dilemma of funding critical infrastructure requirements at the expense of OPTEMPO mission needs. With the Army leadership pushing transformation and standardization of services, Eighth Army was facing a problem with massive infrastructure costs of standardization. All major Military Construction (MILCON) would require congressional approval and go through the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process. As stated above, constantly shuffling of funds from identified infrastructure requirements by tactical mission commanders to meet critical mission shortages caused the Army leadership to change its management oversight.

ARMY LEADERSHIP FACING COMPLEX ISSUES

Any Army transformation would require senior leadership to face complexities never encountered during the 1980's and 1990's when the Army was transforming its fighting capability, but not its management style. To fully transform installations, the Department of Defense (DOD) would require an overhaul of existing systems management and funding

practices would require several revisions and future infrastructure spending would have to be thoroughly revised. Future infrastructure spending would require a standardized system of measuring and prioritizing installation management. Senior mission commanders could no longer set priorities; and a particular MACOM, as a tenant on an installation, no longer unfairly influence funding decisions. Changes of this magnitude would require a total overhaul of existing DOD regulations. In some cases laws related to Congressional outlays and fencing of dollars would have to be changed to ensure the proper distribution of funding and resources allotted for infrastructure support.

OCONUS senior mission commanders were faced with different types of challenges and concentrated on training and maintaining mission requirements, so at times they ignored infrastructure requirements that eventually would affect the installations ability to support the mission due to degradation in infrastructure. To address the complexities and challenges OCONUS installations would face, IMA required an analysis of the history and issues challenging installation management transformation.

TRANSFORMATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

In 2001, Secretary of the Army Mr. Thomas White directed the Transformation of Installation Management (TIM) through a management oversight process. This process called for a new headquarters that would be separate and subordinate to ACSIM that would have several regional directorates with the responsibility to implement installation management transformation. The Secretary of the Army directed that the Army's senior mission commanders and its leadership get out of the daily installation management operation decisions and focus on their operational mission. Secretary White's direction, which was supported by the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Chief of Staff of the Army General Shinseki, was to "establish a highly trained military and civilian organization to manage Army installations worldwide, thereby enabling the combat soldiers to concentrate on their tactical missions"¹⁰.

Secretary White's intent was to develop an implementation plan for TIM throughout the Army with one clear direction with "zero sum gains throughout the process. This transformation would be accomplished without an increase in manpower or funding."¹¹ In order to have a successful transformation, IMA recruited CONUS based MACOM representatives and installation experts and began analyzing MACOM manpower documents and funding issues. Initially, OCONUS representatives did not attend planning and analysis meetings. But this quickly changed as an Army-wide transition matrix was being developed to meet the original

intent of reorganization. So representatives from the entire Army eventually participated in the transformation process.

TRANSFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

In order to ensure an orderly transformation, Secretary White, along with the General Shinseki, directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation Management (ACSIM) to develop a plan that ACSIM would use to transform installation management across the Army. The Secretary's intent was clear - realign the following duties: daily management and funding of installations and to ensure fenced infrastructure dollars were spent on identified Installation Status Report (ISR) requirements. The second duty was to establish an organization to manage daily running of installations thus allowing senior mission commanders to concentrate on the tactical mission rather than the daily business of installation management. The third function was to move Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) military positions back to the mission documents and replace resulting shortfalls with civilians or contractors to provide base operations support. Finally, to establish a Standard Garrison Organization (SGO) document that could be utilized across the Army thus increasing efficiencies and providing standardized positions and services on a worldwide basis.

Although these changes were not wholly transformational, they did challenge prior practices that existed within OCONUS installations. Beginning in the mid 1990's the Army began training Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels along with Department of the Army Civilians (DAC) to manage installations as a full time job. However, there were still the command and control issues as final funding decisions were being made by senior mission commanders. By training military and civilian personnel to manage the installations, the Army could aggressively continue its transformation effort in installation management and move the senior mission commander away from installation management responsibilities.

IMA CHALLENGES (CONUS)

Although CONUS installation command and control systems were mature and well established, functional OCONUS installations were managed entirely differently due to the tactical situation and senior mission commanders' focus on the theater operational plans. Under the control of MG Aadland, IMA began setting the early stages of a headquarters under the direct control of ACSIM with the following mission statement: "Provide equitable, effective and efficient management of Army installations worldwide to support mission readiness and execution, enable the well-being of Soldiers, civilians and family members, improve infrastructure, and preserve the environment".¹² By clarifying the command structure and

specifying IMA's role, this statement would provide the intent and guidance to implement true transformation throughout the Army.

Although several installations in CONUS had different MACOMs tenants and funding and manpower came through the MACOMs, project funding was many times based on the senior mission commander's wants rather than identified ISR requirements. Each year, installations reviewed their infrastructure status and rated each facility with a quantity and quality rating that was forwarded to HQDA for review and approval. The basis of the ratings (C1-4: C1 highest - C4 lowest) provided ratings for each installation and funding was then allocated based on the Army's overall requirements. MG Van Antwerp stated during his brief to Army leaders in January 2002 "that 2/3 of our facilities are C3/C4 and to bring them up to C3 would cost over 15 billion dollars"³ based on reprogramming infrastructure funds to mission shortfalls. The funding challenges installations faced continued to increase each year and shortages in Sustainment, Restoration and Maintenance (SRM) funds persisted.

IMA CHALLENGES (OCONUS)

Eighth Army continued to refine the implementation process, but felt totally constrained on how to implement the "cookie cutter" SGO approach to installation management in an OCONUS environment based on a policy of "zero growth". Over 25 percent of its key Korean management directorates were TDA active duty soldiers, requiring a one-for-one civilian replacement for each soldier moved. This type of relationship and command and control issue did not exist in CONUS as the individual units were all Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) units working for the senior mission commander. Although MTOE soldiers were assigned to support the installation, many times mission priorities conflicted with the garrison commander responsibilities resulting in a lack of services provided to the installation. Would the customer suddenly receive fewer services as result of loss of manpower to meet the requirements? Who would make up the funding shortfalls to continue standard services? These issues and challenges stated above would have to be answered and resolved prior to implement IMA's SGO.

IMA clearly stated the SGO concept which was already developed and patterned after CONUS large, medium and small installations (see figure 1). The directorate setup and command and control functions were already established and did not meet OCONUS needs. In Korea, there were several installation services usually provided by MTOE soldiers that were not performed due to their support to the senior mission commander. The key was to transform existing organizations predominantly manned by soldiers into a civilian dominated organization

in a deployed environment. What was becoming abundantly clear to Eighth Army leaders were that many of the ACSIM decisions were based on CONUS garrisons without considering OCONUS installation issues.




FIGURE 1

EIGHTH U.S. ARMY ISSUES

There were many show-stoppers in the initial process: One of the most glaring was how OCONUS installations were going to implement SGO with Common Levels of Support (CLS) without the proper resources. More importantly, how would OCONUS installations continue support for their forward deployed missions? During one of IMAs early visits, a transition brief was presented to Eighth Army. Then both the Sub-unified commander and Eighth Army CG stated the key issue was simple: in a deployed environment whose motto is “ready to fight tonight” from the installations it lives, the Korean peninsula should have its own Region, with an Army General Officer (GO) as the Korean Region Director. Eighth Army’s request differed from the initial IMA concept and it was disapproved at the initial working group. Army leaders in Korea were so adamant about having a GO for their Region Director because they needed a senior officer to overcome mission commanders’ reluctance to give up access to base operations funds that had been previously used to support OPTEMPO requirements. After a few more visits, IMA agreed to a Korean Region. Eighth Army reluctantly began the process of implementing Installation Management and the plan to transfer control from 19th TSC to IMA through a Korea Region Office (KORO) with a GO director was initiated.

In addition to establishing the SGO throughout the Army, the Secretary directed the Army to become more efficient through programs like Activity Based Costing (ABC) which required installations to measure effectiveness and efficiencies which promoted efficiency in providing standardized services. IMA directed each region through its installations to manage programs efficiently; and accordingly, IMA would track progress. There would be standards to follow and efficiencies would be gained by each region. Installations had incentives -- any funds saved through efficiencies could be kept by the installation to fund other installation programs. However, efficiencies available to CONUS-based installations were not readily available to OCONUS installations.

IMA directed regions to implement Service Based Costing (SBC) which was designed to track costs related to services provided to "installations" customers. For example, if an installation counseling center provided drug and alcohol services to its customers, then the installation would track the costs of each service. The Army's established standard costs at installations represented an effort for installations to meet or exceed established standardized cost factors, but several factors resulted in higher costs for OCONUS installations. The major unconsidered factor in this program was the geographic location where the support agencies are located to provide the additional services. If the command is located OCONUS and has to send its urine samples to CONUS for analysis, then the costs per unit are going to be higher. These types of issues and discrepancies were not identified prior to establishing policies directing standard services at fixed prices.

20TH AREA SUPPORT GROUP/AREA IV

The 20th Area Support Group/Area IV was a fully functioning ASG with both mission support to the senior mission commander and daily installation management support of its garrisons in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. In June 2002, Eighth Army directed 20th ASG/Area IV to implement the IMA /KORO plan to separate the mission and daily installation management operations. This required the 20th ASG to separate from the Area IV TDA. 20th ASG assumed the mission side and Area IV changed its name to the Area IV Support Activity and assumed the daily installation management. 20th ASG conducted a Mission Analysis (MA) to determine the best Course of Action (COA) to effectively separate the 20th ASG and Area IV to meet IMA implementation timeframes. In addition, there was a need to address critical manpower and operational command and control issues the 20th ASG and Area IV faced based on the separation of duties.

The 20th ASG document listed dual TOE/TDA positions for 145 soldiers since they were dual-hatted in a mission and installation management operation. During the negotiation process between Eighth Army and IMA, there was not much agreement on transferring military positions from 20th ASG to KORO. The 19th TSC and Eighth Army wanted to retain all active duty soldiers and some Emergency Essential Civilian/Mission Essential Civilian (EEC/MEC) personnel to support the tactical mission commander. This was one of the major issues as a result of separating the base operations from mission since the majority of the soldiers' daily duty was in support of the installation. Mission soldiers were mainly used to support mission requirements during the two Korean theater exercises while the remaining effort was focused on daily installation management support.

AREA IV SUPPORT ACTIVITY (ASA)

In order to successfully implement a SGO, Area IV Support Activity was required to replace 145 soldiers throughout six directorates. As the largest deployed ASG in Korea, Area IV's real-time missions of supporting Non-combatants Evacuation Operation (NEO) and processing incoming personnel and equipment was a full time mission and required either replacing the lost soldiers by using Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM) or adding additional civilians. The remaining TDA assigned civilians were Emergency Essential Civilians (EEC), both U.S. and Local National (LN) personnel, which provided support and provided the daily installation management of Area IV installations.

Managing a \$95 million dollar budget, 900 personnel, and a deployed ASA supporting a daily installation mission is a challenge, but achievable. Installation funding shortfalls led to transformation. Numerous deployments forced the Army to retool its management effort and look into new and innovative ways to fund, manage and provide common support. Many services were provided by the soldiers within the 20th ASG, particularly in base defense, force protection, administrative services, and other critical operational areas.

Significantly, the soldiers still performed their military duties, leading to shortfalls in daily installation management support. To address this issue Area IV designated several DAC and LN personnel as EEC and MEC to meet any exercise shortfalls. Realizing the need for additional military personnel to support its daily management, Area IV identified over 100 positions requiring BMM to assist until permanent civilians could be hired, trained and assigned to replace the BMM. Additionally, Area IV needed to utilize the Korean Service Corps (KSC) personnel to assist on short term issues but realized the need to address long term issues with their peacetime and wartime mission overlaps. Until permanent positions were implemented,

Area IV would face severe manpower shortages requiring BMM or temporary civilian hires in support of engineer and transportation requirements to meet its daily installation mission.

There were other obstacles to fielding a quality organization within the SGO parameters. To be successful each individual within the organization must have a clear and concise knowledge of the process. General Gordon Sullivan, former Chief of Staff Army declared, "in an organization like ours you have to think though what it is that you are becoming. Like a marathon runner, you have to get out in front, mentally and pull the organization to you. You have to visualize the finish line to see yourself there and pull yourself along, not push, but pull yourself to the future."¹⁴ Visualizing and clearly understanding the Chief of Staff's intent was one of the first step needed to begin transformation throughout the Army.

There were a few base support responsibilities retained by Area IV, such as base defense, installation access control, and NEO. These areas identified by the commander as critical concerns required immediate resolution. Other support area responsibilities such as information management, installation property book, and personnel and equipment management gained during the transition could be addressed at a later date. Some other concerns that were not specifically addressed and policy was not provided were funding issues related to OCONUS installations including non-appropriated fund (NAF) and appropriated fund (AF) shortfalls, BMM, foreign labor costs and reimbursements from tenant units for services provided. Issues related to utilities (power, sewage, garbage) and contract management were also identified along with other areas unique to OCONUS installations that would require additional re-examination of the IMA implementation policy and guidance, and what COA to take for a successful implementation.

Based on IMA guidance, the 20th ASG and Area IV began the tedious process of identifying issues and timeframes to begin implementation. The first area analyzed was manpower and its shortages for both organizations. The Area IV FY02 TDA (which included the 20th ASG personnel) was as follows: 145 soldiers, 115 DAC, 725 LN for a total of 985 personnel."¹⁵ The initial assessment by KORO and Area IV was that the implementation was barely doable if supported by both organizations until Area IV ASA directorates could be manned with civilians to begin a true reorganization of an ASA in KORO.

Another critical problem was to meet the daily installation management mission during exercises like Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) or Ulichi Focus Lens (UFL). The initial reaction was that this was impossible due to losing 145 soldiers from the 20th ASG. Duties requiring coverage included: force protection, staff duty, administration (both military and civilian), DOIM support, intelligence, plans and support operations. The reality was

clear -- losing 145 soldiers and continuing the same installation support was impossible without additional manpower. After analyzing the personnel budget numbers and future restrictions on moving funds from one area to another, it was clear that Area IV ASA would require reorganization, new authorizations and millions of personnel dollars to systematically fill shortages in each directorate (Plans, Operations, Personnel and Logistics). The emerging question was how long Area IV could function without critical personnel hiring. Area IV utilized BMM and supplemented the remaining shortages with EEC/MEC personnel. The main issue was that TDA civilians, not formally responsible for contingency support, were suddenly asked to transfer to newly created EEC positions, causing many civilians to decline and request transfers to non EEC positions. Many Area IV civilians were reluctant to transfer to an EEC position because it added several additional responsibilities including: physical requirements, wearing uniforms, working longer hours, and manning and maintaining an Emergency Operation Center (EOC).

Within Area IV there were several functional areas that didn't fit into IMA's standard template due to OCONUS organizational structures including signal, military police, DOIM, intelligence, personnel, and finance units which provide daily support to the installation commander outside his chain of command. Furthermore, tactical unit's missions did not coincide with installation priorities as supporting the senior mission commander took precedence. On the other hand, at CONUS installations, organizations work directly for the installation commander.

Based on the Area IV "prioritized personnel shortage list" KORO reviewed the new manpower requirement classification (MRC) document and then requested guidance from IMA on hiring for all new positions within Area IV. A key manpower issue from KORO's perspective was to fill personnel shortages utilizing hire lag dollars (positions authorized and funded but left unfilled by the command) and recruit. Although expediting the process by creating standard MRC's and Job Description (JD) saved time in recruitment process, it still was taking up to six months to recruit new personnel and place them into newly established Area IV positions.

LESSONS LEARNED

IMA's seeks full implementation of TIM/SGO no later than 2005. However, several circumstances existed that delayed full implementation of transformation on the Korean peninsula and provides lessons learned. In the Korea peninsula, there were numerous instances when support could not be provided due to lack of funds or lower priority on the Korean theater installation priority resource list. In one instance IMA would not fund an Eighth

Army mission upgrade of an existing facility that was a critical tactical communication link for the senior mission commander. This standoff between KORO and Eighth Army required HQDA to provide funds for the project. Since this was an end of the year project where funds were not available and the project cost exceeded a certain dollar threshold, it required higher headquarters involvement. This type of issue would not have occurred if funding decisions rested with the senior mission commander and the final funding was executed in accordance with the senior mission commanders' priorities rather than the installation managers.

IMA's worldwide intent was clear by stating there will be a full implementation of managing installations utilizing a SGO format and command and that control would be through the installation to one of the seven regions through to IMA no later than fiscal year 2005. In addition, all SRM funding identified and locked into a particular installation would be spent on the installation for the identified project unless ACSIM approved moving monies either within a region or between regions.

In 2003 IMA HQs was established along with the seven regions supporting over 181 installations worldwide. However, CONUS transitions seemed smoother and such was not the case in OCONUS particularly in support of USFK. The challenges CONUS installations faced were minimal given the established SGO was for the most part already implemented. More importantly, CONUS garrison commanders' responsibilities did not increase since the command and control of garrison units were embedded internally so units like military police, signal, contracting and judge advocate did not experience change in responsibilities or command and control.

In KORO the challenge was much greater than initially realized. The majority of the installation support units were tactical units that fell under the command and control of external tactical commanders supporting the senior mission commander. The dilemma many tenant commanders faced was trying to support the installation management needs while facing a real-time mission of "fight tonight".

Once the reorganization was implemented in Eighth Army during 2003, the senior mission commander relinquished daily installation management control. During the transition period of 2003-2004 there seemed to be was a sense of relief on the tactical side but also frustration due to some mission requirements being unfunded due to the fencing of SRM funds. In KORO the senior mission commander could now concentrate on mission planning, training, equipping, and ensuring soldiers and EEC/MEC civilian personnel were prepared and focused on the wartime mission.

CONCLUSION

The complexities of installation management are vast; they touch all facets of a military environment. The Army has finally decided to streamline and operate in a business environment with greater efficiencies. Such transformation must happen at the ground level within our installations. Wrestling control from senior mission commanders is truly transformational. It goes against the core military values of seniority and leadership. To be truly successful, transformation requires a change of thinking and a sense of ownership from its leadership thus setting the direction for the workforce to follow.

Transformation in today's Army is needed in many areas. The current Army Chief of Staff continued on the theme from the last Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki by declaring, "Our installations are our Flagships."¹⁶ The Director of IMA Major General Johnson declared that with transformation "it drives home the tremendous importance of our installations to Army readiness".¹⁷ Under his leadership, "IMA and its installations continue to develop new and innovative means to manage its installations in a more efficient and streamlined effort by supporting technology advancements in equipment systems, advanced strategic and lethal bombs, better education for our soldiers, joint service training, and inoperability advancements in training and communication systems. All these enhancements along with continuing support in improving quality of life for all soldiers, civilians and their families is his promise and guarantee to all whom serve."¹⁸ Whether in a civilian corporation or a government controlled organization, transformation cannot be successful without leaders and managers wanting change and organizational change will not occur unless people within the organization support change. As Dr. Robert Murphy observed, "Organizations will need to continue to focus the energy on resources in order to survive, but they must do so with different rules, techniques, and procedures than before."¹⁹ So each member within the installation team will be critical to the outcome. All must support the common theme of transformation within installation management.

The Army continues to place extreme hardships on our soldier's families. Their continued interest in remaining in the Army family is lessening. To improve, the Army must be more efficient in resource management and ensure that regardless of where our soldiers are stationed, they will receive excellent services. No longer can the Army or DOD ask "can we afford to do this" or "how we are going to fund this"? The funding is there. Every year the services go through the process of requesting infrastructure and services improvements. The Congress provides the funding, but Army leaders continue to find one excuse after another to not to fund projects, usually based on perceived higher mission priorities.

Throughout the paper there were several areas identified as issues related to manpower, funding, command and control, and differences between Korean and CONUS installations. Each of IMA's 181 installations provide a key role in support of transformation for today's Army and serve a key role whether supporting a combatant commander or power projection platform. The establishment of IMA and the command and control of installations through a single HQ's allows management of installations to be more efficient and better capable to standardize services worldwide. Another improvement with IMA was the establishment of the Installation Management Board of Directors (IM-BOD) that allows senior mission commanders to vote and approve programs and certain funding at installations thus allowing the senior Army leadership to continue to be part of the overall process of installation management.

The goal of a single standard across the spectrum is not only the Army's goal, but our promise to our soldiers, civilians and their families. The Army families have earned an enhanced "quality of life" based on their promise to fight for it. Our soldiers deserve a leadership commitment from installation management professionals. IMA and its subordinate installations accept the transformation challenge and will continue to improve installation management by continuing to create new and innovative means in providing quality services on a daily basis.

WORD COUNT= 6,070

ENDNOTES

¹Installation Management Agency (IMA), "Vision Statement" January 2004; available from <<https://www.ima.army.mil>>; Internet; accessed 26 September 2004.

²Area IV Support Activity (ASA), "Vision Statement," briefing slides, ASA IV, Daegu, Korea, 1 April 2004.

³Thomas White, "Transformation of Installation Management Brief," briefing slides with commentary, Nashville, TN, March 2001.

⁴Department of Defense, Quadrennial Department Report (QDR) 2001, *Transforming Defense* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 16.

⁵Leon LePorte, "Eighth Army Readiness Brief," briefing charts, Seoul, Korea, June 2002.

⁶Eighth U.S. Army, "Mission Statement," Eighth U.S. Army, Seoul, Korea, 1 June 2000.

⁷Van Antwerp, "Installations Management Brief," briefing charts, Washington, DC, 10 January 2001, 3.

⁸Donald Gregg, "Despite a Dictatorial Streak, South Korea's Long-Serving President Converted an Economic Basket Case into an Industrial Powerhouse," *Time Asia*, 23-30 August 1999, volume 154, 7/8.

⁹Gary Leupp, "History of Korean-American Relations," *Counter Punch Article*, 31 December 2002, pg 2.

¹⁰Thomas White, "Transformation of Installation Management Brief", Nashville, TN, March 2001.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²IMA, "Vision Statement" September 2004; available from <<https://www.ima.army.mil>>; Internet; accessed 26 September 2004.

¹³Van Antwerp, "Installations Management Brief," briefing charts, Washington, DC, 10 January 2001, 7.

¹⁴Gordon R. Sullivan, *Establishing Intent*, FM 22-100, Army Leadership, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, August 1999), 6-5.

¹⁵20th Area Support Group, *FY02 Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) Manpower Document*, (Daegu, Korea, Eighth U.S. Army, 16 October 2001).

¹⁶Peter Schoomaker, "Command Statement IMA Website," September 2004; available from <<https://www.ima.army.mil>>; Internet; accessed 26 September 2004.

¹⁷Robert Johnson, "Director's Message IMA website," September 2004; available from <<https://www.ima.army.mil>>; Internet; accessed 26 September 2004.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Robert Murphy, "Managing Strategic Change:" *An Executive Overview*, Carlisle Barracks: Department of Command Leadership and Management, U.S. Army War College, June 2004), 62.

GLOSSARY

19 th TAACOM	19 th Theater Army Area Command
19 th TSC	19 th Theater Support Command
AAR	After Action Report
ABC	Activity Based Costing
ACSIM	Assistant Chief of Staff Installation Management
AFH	Army Family Housing
AIC	The Army Installations Center
AIM-HI	Army Installation Management – High
AF	Appropriated Fund
ASA	Area Support Activity
ASG	Area Support Command
BMM	Borrowed Military Manpower
CFC	Combined Forces Command
CFSC	Community Family Support Command
CG	Commanding General
CLS	Common Level of Support
CONUS	Continental United States
DOD	Department of Defense
DOIM	Directorate of Information Management
EEC	Emergency Essential Civilians
Eighth Army	Eighth United States Army
HQDA	Headquarters Department of Army
IMA	Installation Management Agency
ISR	Installation Status Report
JD	Job Description
KORO	Korea Region Office
KTO	Korean Theater Operations
MA	Mission Analysis
MACOM	Major Army Command
MEC	Mission Essential Civilians
MRC	Manpower Requirements Classification
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NAF	Non-appropriated Funds
NEO	Noncombatants Evacuation Operation
NETCOM	Network Enterprise Technology Command
OCONUS	Overseas Continental United States
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
ROK	Republic of Korea/Korean
RSO&I	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
SBC	Service Based Costing
SGO	Standard Garrison Organization
SSC	Standard Service Costing
SRM	Sustainment, Restoration and Maintenance
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
UNC	United Nations Command

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